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Abstract
Social media communication has become a significant part of daily activity in modern societies. For this reason, ensuring safety in
social media platforms is a necessity. Use of dangerous language such as physical threats in online environments is a somewhat rare, yet
remains highly important. Although several works have been performed on the related issue of detecting offensive and hateful language,
dangerous speech has not previously been treated in any significant way. Motivated by these observations, we report our efforts to build
a labeled dataset for dangerous speech. We also exploit our dataset to develop highly effective models to detect dangerous content. Our
best model performs at 59.60% macro F1, significantly outperforming a competitive baseline.
1. Introduction
The proliferation of social media makes it necessary to
ensure online safety. Unfortunately, offensive, hateful, ag-
gressive, etc., language continues to be used online and put
the well-being of millions of people at stake. In some cases,
it has been reported that online incidents have caused not
only mental and psychological trouble to some users but
have indeed forced some to deactivate their accounts or, in
extreme cases, even commit suicides (Hinduja and Patchin,
2010). Previous work has focused on detecting various
types of negative online behavior, but not necessarily
dangerous speech. In this work, our goal is to bridge this
gap by investigating dangerous content. More specifically,
we focus on direct threats in Arabic Twitter. A threat can
be defined as “a statement of an intention to inflict pain,
injury, damage, or other hostile action on someone in ret-
ribution for something done or not done.”1 This definition
highlights two main aspects: (1) the speaker’s intention of
committing an act, which (2) he/she believes to be unfavor-
able to the addressee (Fraser, 1998). We especially direct
our primary attention to threats of physical harm. We build
a new dataset for training machine learning classifiers to
detect dangerous speech. Clearly, resulting models can be
beneficial in protecting online users and communities alike.
The fact that social media users can create fake accounts
on online platforms makes it possible for such users to
employ hostile and dangerous language without worrying
about facing effective social nor legal consequences. This
continues to put the responsibility on platforms such as
Facebook and Twitter to maintain safe environments for
their users. These networks have related guidelines and
invest in fighting negative and dangerous content. Twitter,
for example, prohibits any form of violence including
threats of physical harm and promotion of terrorism. 2
However, due to the vast volume of communication on
these platforms, it is not easy to detect harmful content
manually. Our work aims at developing automated models
† Both authors contributed equally.
1https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/
definition/threat
2https://help.twitter.com/en/
rules-and-policies/twitter-rules
to help alleviate this problem in the context of dangerous
speech.
Our focus on Arabic is motivated by the wide use of so-
cial media in the Arab world (Lenze, 2017). Relatively re-
cent estimates indicate that there are over 11M monthly
active users as of March 2017, posting over 27M tweets
each day (Salem, 2017). An Arabic country such as Saudi
Arabia has the highest Twitter penetration level world-
wide, with 37% (Iqbal, 2019). The Arabic language also
presents interesting challenges primarily due to the dialec-
tical variations cutting across all its linguistic levels: pho-
netic, phonological, morphological, semantic and syntac-
tic (Farghaly and Shaalan, 2009). Our work caters for
dialectal variations in that we collect data using multi-
dialectal seeds (Section 3.). Overall, we make the following
contributions:
1) We manually curate a multi-dialectal dictionary of
physical harm threats that can be used to collect data
for training dangerous language models.
2) We use our lexicon to collect a large dataset of threat-
ening speech from Arabic Twitter, and manually an-
notate a subset of the data for dangerous speech. Our
datasets are freely available online.5
3) We investigate and characterize threatening speech in
Arabic Twitter.
4) We train effective models for detecting dangerous
speech in Arabic.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Sec-
tion 2., we review related literature. Building dangerous
lexica used to collect our datasets is discussed in Section 3..
We describe our annotation in Section 4.. We present our
models in Section 5., and conclude in Section 6..
2. Related work
Detection of offensive language in natural languages has
recently attracted the interest of multiple researchers.
However, the space of abusive language is vast and has
its own nuances. Waseem et al. (2017) classify abusive
language along two dimensions: directness (the level to
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which it is directed to a specific person or organization or
not) and explicitness (the degree to which it is explicit). Jay
and Janschewitz (2008) categorize offensive language
to three categories: Vulgar, Pornographic, and Hateful.
The Hateful category includes offensive language such as
threats as well as language pertaining to class, race, or
religion, among others. In the literature, these concepts
are sometimes confused or even ignored altogether. In the
following, we explore some of the relevant work on each
of these themes.
Offensive Language. The terms offensive language and
abusive language are commonly used interchangeably.
They are cover terms that usually include all types of
undesirable language such as hateful, racist, obscene, and
dangerous speech. We review some work looking at these
types of language here, with no specific focus on any of its
forms. GermEval 2018 is a shared task on the Identification
of Offensive Language in German proposed by Wiegand
et al. (2018). Their dataset consists of 8, 500 annotated
tweets with two labels, “offensive” and “non-offensive”.
Another relevant shared task is the OffensEval (Zampieri
et al., 2019), which focuses on identifying and categorizing
offensive language in social media. Very recently, an
Arabic offensive language shared task is included in
the 4th Workshop on Open-Source Arabic Corpora and
Processing Tools (OSACT4). 3
Hate Speech. Hate speech is a type of language that is bi-
ased, hostile, and malicious targeting a person or a group of
people because of some of their actual or perceived innate
characteristics (Gitari et al., 2015). This type of harmful
language received the most attention in the literature. Bur-
nap and Williams (2014) investigate the manifestation
and diffusion of hate speech and antagonistic content in
Twitter in relation to situations that could be classified as
‘trigger’ events for hate crimes. Their dataset consists of
450K tweets collected during a two weeks window in the
immediate aftermath of Drummer Lee Rigby’s murder in
Woolwich, UK. In Waseem (2016), issues of annotation
reliability are discussed. Authors examine whether the
expertise level of annotators (e.g expert or amateur) and/or
the type of information provided to the annotators, can
improve the classification of hate speech. For this purpose,
they extend the dataset of (Waseem and Hovy, 2016)
with a set of about 7K tweets annotated by two types of
CrowdFlower users: expert and amateur. They find that
hate speech detection models trained on expert annotations
outperform those trained on amateur annotations. This
suggests that hate speech can be implicit and thus harder
to detect by humans and machines alike. Another work
by (Davidson et al., 2017) builds a hate speech lexicon
based on a list of words and phrases provided by Hate-
base.org. Using Twitter API, they crawled a set of 85M
tweets containing terms from the lexicon. Most recent
works on detecting hate on Twitter are done as part of a
SemEval2019 competition, HatEval (O`scar Garibo, 2019).
3http://edinburghnlp.inf.ed.ac.uk/
workshops/OSACT4/
This shared task addresses the problem of multilingual
detection of hate speech against immigrants and women in
Twitter.
Obscene Language. Obscene speech includes vulgar and
pornographic speech. A few research papers have looked
at this kind of speech in social media (Singh et al., 2016;
Mubarak et al., 2017; Alshehri et al., 2018). Mubarak
et al. (2017) present an automated method to create and
expand a list of obscene words, for the purpose of detecting
obscene language. Abozinadah (2015) build a dataset of
over 1M tweets comprising the most recent 50 tweets of
255 users who has participated in swearing hashtags as
well as the most recent 50 tweets of users in their network.
As feature input to their classifiers, the authors extracted
basic statistical measures from each tweet and reported
96% accuracy of adult content detection. Alshehri et al.
(2018) build a dataset of adult content in Arabic twitter
and their distributors. The work identifies geographical
distribution of targets of adult content and develops models
for detecting spreaders of such content.Alshehri et al.
(2018) report 79% accuracy on detecting adult content.
Racism and Sexism. Kwok and Wang (2013) create
a balanced dataset comprising 24, 582 of ‘racist’ and
‘non-racist’ tweets. Waseem and Hovy (2016) collect a
set of 136K hate tweets based on a list of common terms
and slurs pertaining ethnic minorities, gender, sexuality,
and religion. Afterwards, a random set of 16K tweets
are selected and manually annotated with three labels:
‘racist’, ‘sexist’, or “neither”. Gamba¨ck and Sikdar (2017)
introduce a deep-learning-based Twitter hate speech text
classification model. Using data from Waseem and Hovy
(2016) with about 6.5K tweets, the model classifies tweets
into four categories: ‘sexist’, ‘racist’, ‘both sexist and
racist’, and ‘neither’. Clarke and Grieve (2017), using
the same list, explore differences among racist and sexist
tweets along three dimensions: interactiveness, antago-
nism, and attitude and find an overall significant difference
between them.
Dangerous Language. Little work has been dedicated
to detection and classification of dangerous language and
threats. They are usually part of work on abusive and hate
speech. This is to say that dangerous language has only
been indirectly investigated within the NLP community.
However, there is some research that is not necessarily
computational in nature. For example, Gales (2011)
investigates the correlation between interpersonal stance
and the realization of threats by analyzing a corpus of 470
authentic threats. Ultimately, the goal of Gale’s work is
to help predict violence before it occurs. Hardaker and
McGlashan (2016), on the other hand, investigates the
language surrounding threats of rape on Twitter. In their
corpus, the authors find that women were the prime target
of rape threats. In the rest of this paper, we explore the
space and language of threats in Arabic Twitter. We now
describe our lexicon and datasets.
Verb Dialect English Verb Dialect English Verb Dialect English
XAK.

@ G,M,R exterminate 	P G,M contuse Qm.
	¯
all blow up
ÉK

@ E,L kill Q¢ * E,G mark   	¯ G,L split
øX

@ * E,G give qÊ all skin ©® 	¯* E,G,L,R burst
ÐY«

@ all execute Ê E,G,R boil ½ 	¯* E,G,L disentangle
ú 	æ 	¯

@ G,M,R exterminate l .
 M slash ÉJ¯ all kill
½Êë

@ G,M,R destroy H. Qå ** E,G,L,R drink hQ
¯ E sound
ÈAJ 	«@ G,L,M,R assassinate
  E,G,L,R rip off Õæ¯ all divide
I. J
	«@ all rape èñ  E,G,L,R distort
	­¯ G,R smash
©ÊJ¯ @ * G,L,R pluck ÐQå G cut off Õæ
¯ G,M smash
¢. E,L,M assault  	® G,L slap úæ	¯ E,G,L,M eliminate
hQk. all wound qÊ G,L skin ©¢¯ all cut
P 	Qk. G cut off H. Qå 	 all hit ©Ê
¯ E,G,L,R pluck
YÊg. all whip q£ E,G shoot Qå» all breakQk all burn 	áª£ all stab qÖÏ G hit
Ñ¢k E,L,M,R smash Q
£ E,G,L,R make fly Am× ** E,G,L,R erase
¼X E,G,L demolish H.
	Y« E,G,M,R torture m× M destroy
½ëX G run over H. 	Q« E torture Qm
	' E,G,M,R slaughter
l'. 	X all slaughter Q®« E,G kill 	­	 E,G,M,R blast
Ñk. P E,G,M,R stone ½J 	¯ E,G,L,M destroy Õæë G,L,R smash
Table 1: Our list of dangerous verbs. NOTE. All= all dialects, E= Egyptian, G= Gulf, L= Levantine, M= MSA. R=
Maghrebi, * = metaphorical, ** = used idiomatically.
3. Dangerous Lexica and Dataset
3.1. Dangerous Language
We define dangerous language as a statement of an inten-
tion to inflict physical pain, injury, or damage on someone
in retribution for something done or not. This definition ex-
cludes threats that do not reflect physical harm on the side
of the receiver end of the threat. The definition also ex-
cludes tongue in cheek whose real intention is to tease. An
example of this later category is a threat made in the con-
text of sports where it is common among fans to tease one
another using metaphorical, string language (see Example
# 6 in Section 4.1.).
3.2. Dangerous Lexica
We came up with a list of 57 verbs in their basic form that
can be used literally or metaphorically to indicate physical
harm (see table 1). This list is by no means exhaustive,
although we did our best to expand it as much as possible.
As such, the list covers the frequent verbs used in the
threatening domain in Arabic. 4 These verbs are used in
one or more of the following varieties: Egyptian, Gulf,
Levantine, Maghrebi, and MSA (see table 2 for more
details). Most of these verbs (n=50 out of 57) literally
indicate physical harm. Examples are 	áª£ (‘to stap’)
4The concept of frequency here is based on native speaker
knowledge of the language. The list was developed by the 3
authors, all of whom are native speakers of Arabic with multi-
dialectal fluency.
and qÊ (‘to de-skin’). The rest are used (sometimes
metaphorically) to indicate threatening, such as ©ÊJ¯ @ (‘to
pluck’) and Q¢ (‘to mark’) usually with a body part
such as ék. ð (‘face’) or 

@P (‘head’). Finally, some of
the verbs are used idiomatically, such as ÐX 	áÓ H. Qå (‘to
drink someone’s blood’) and 	PB@ ð úÎ« 	áÓ Am× (‘to
erase/eliminate from the face of the earth’). Multiword
expressions in our seed list can be found in Table 3.
Dialect # of verbs
MSA 30
Gulf 50
Egyptian 39
Maghrebi 34
Levantine 34
All (unique) 57
Table 2: Distribution of threat verbs across Arabic dialects.
To be able to collect data, we used our manually curated list
to construct threat phrases indicating physical harm such as
½ÊJ¯ @ (‘I kill you’) and èQåºK
 (‘He breaks him/it’). That is,
each phrase consists of a physical harm verb, a singular or
plural first or third person subject, and a plural or singular
second or third person object. This gives us the following
pattern:
1st/3rd (SG / PL) + threat verb + 2nd/3rd (SG / PL)
Some of the phrases only differ on the basis of spelling due
to dialectical variations. For example, the body part ék. ð
(‘face’) can be spelled as ÕºîD
k. ð or Õºëñk. ð in the plural
form depending on the dialect. Another example is the verb
ÉJ¯ (‘kill’), which can also be spelled as ÉK@ in Egyptian and
some other Arabic dialects. Manual search of some of the
seed tokens in twitter suggests that patterns involving 3rd
person subject are almost always not threats. The following
are two illustrating examples of this non-threatening use:
1) QåJ. Ë @ 	ªK. ékQ 	¯ ÉJ®K
 é 	K A
	¯ Éj. 
 ÕË @ 	X @ ú
æJ
Ó
‘If he doesn’t score, Messi kills happiness in some people’
2) ú
ÍA
	« 	m øñ . . . Q£A	mÌ'@ QåºK
 AÓ
‘Only a dear friend can break one’s heart’
Thus, we decided to limit our list of phrases to ‘direct’ dan-
gerous threats, which are phrases involving a singular or
plural first person subject and singular or plural second per-
son object as follows:
1st (SG/PL) + threat verb + 2nd (SG/PL)
Examples of these direct threats include ½J.J 	ª 	K (‘We rape
you’) and Õº¯Qk@ (‘I burn you’). Less dangerous threats
such as ÕºkQk. @ (“We hurt you (all)”) and ½ 	¯ X@ (‘I push
you’) are also not considered. Our motivation for not in-
cluding these latter phrases even though they involve direct
threats is that they indicate less danger and (more crucially)
are more likely to be used metaphorically in Arabic. This
resulted in a set of 286 direct and dangerous phrases, which
constitute our list of ‘dangerous’ seeds. We make the list of
286 direct threats phrases available to the research commu-
nity. 5
3.3. Dataset
We use the constructed ‘dangerous’ seed list to search Twit-
ter using the REST API for two weeks resulting in a dataset
of 2.8M tweets involving ‘direct’ threats as shown in Ta-
ble 4. We then extract user ids from all users who con-
tributed the REST API data (n = 399K users) and crawled
their timelines (n = 705M tweets). We then acquire
107.5M tweets from the timelines, each of which carry one
or more items from our ‘dangerous’ seed list. Combining
these two datasets (the REST API dataset and dataset based
on the timelines) results in a dataset consisting of 110.3M
tweets as shown in Table 4. In this work, we focus on ex-
ploiting the REST API dataset exclusively, leaving the rest
of the data to future research.
4. Data Annotation
4.1. Annotation
We first randomly sample 1K tweets from our REST API
dataset.5 Two of the authors annotated each tweet for being
a threat (‘dangerous’) or not (‘safe’). This sample anno-
tation resulted in a Kappa (κ) score of 0.57, which is fair
5https://github.com/UBC-NLP/ara_
dangspeech.
according to Landis and Koch’s scale (Landis and Koch,
1977). The two annotators then held several discussion ses-
sions to improve their mutual understanding of the problem
and define some instructions as to how to label the data.
We also added another random sample of 4K tweets (for
a total size of 5K) to the annotation pool. After extensive
revisions of the disagreement cases by the two annotators,
the κ score for the whole dataset (5K) was found to be
at 0.90. The annotated dataset has a total of 1, 375 tweets
in the ‘dangerous’ class and 3, 636 in the ‘non-dangerous’
class. Our overall agreed-upon instructions for annotations
include the following:
• Textual threats combined with pleasant emojis such as
and are not dangerous, as opposed to threat
combined with less pleasant emojis such as .
Thus, tweet 3 below should be coded as ‘safe’ while
tweet 4 should be tagged as ‘dangerous’.
3) @user ½ÊJ¯ AK. A 	K

@ Èñ®K
 ¢	JÖÏ @
‘It goes with logic that I kill you ’
4) @user @user @user ½	Jª£@ B . ú
×@Y
¯
‘Move forward [in front of me] or else I stab you ’
• Mitigated threats with question marks or epistemic
modals are dangerous unless they are combined with
positive language or emojis such as Example 5 below.
Note that the word Touha in Example 5 is an infor-
mal, friendly form for Arabic names such as FatHi or
MamdouH.
5) @user ékñK AK
 ½ÊJ¯ @ Qº 	®K. A 	K @
‘I am thinking of killing you, Touha ’
• Threats related to sports are not dangerous. That is be-
cause it is common to use verbs like Qm 	' (“slaughter”)
and I. J
	«@ (“rape”) among fans of rival teams to de-
scribe wins and losses, as in the following example.
6) @user Õ»PñêÔg. 	á
K. ð Õº 	P@ úÎ« ÕºJ.J 	ª 	K éKCg
‘It’s actually better that we ‘rape’ you in your stadium,
among your fans’
• Ambiguous threats such as threats consisting of one
word (as in Example 7 below) should be coded as
‘dangerous’:
7) @ñºÊJ¯ @
‘I kill you’
Below, we show examples of tweets that were annotated as
‘dangerous’:
8) @user @user
H. C¾ÊË ½J
ÓP@ ð ½
¯Qk@ ø
 Xð
‘I wish to burn you and throw you to dogs’
Seed English Seed English
½ÓX 	áÓ H. Qå @ I drink from your blood 	PB@ ð úÎ« 	áÓ ½J
m×@ I erase you from the face of the earth
½ÓX H. Qå @ I drink your blood 	PB@ ð úÎ« 	áÓ ÕºJ
m×@ I erase you all from the face of the earth
ÕºÓX 	áÓ H. Qå @ I drink your blood all ½ÓX 	áÓ H. Qå
	 We drink from your blood
½êk. ð èñ @ I disfigure your face ½ÓX H. Qå
	 We drink your blood
½@P Q
£@ I cut your head ÕºÓX 	áÓ H. Qå
	 We drink your blood all
ÕºðP Q
£@ I cut your head all ½@P Q
¢	 I cut your head
½@P Qm.
	¯ @ I blow up your head ÕºðP Q
¢	 I cut your head all
½êk. ð ©® 	¯ @ I burst your face ½@P Qj. 	® 	K We blow up your head
Õºëñk. ð ©® 	¯ @ I hit your face all ½êk. ð ©® 	® 	K We hit your face
½êk. ð ½ 	¯ @ I disentangle your face ½J
Ê« ú
æ
	® 	K We finish you
½J
Ê« ú
æ
	¯ @ I finish you ÕºJ
Ê« ú
æ
	® 	K We finish you all
ÕºJ
Ê« ú
æ
	¯ @ I finish you all 	PB@ ð úÎ« 	áÓ ½J
jÖ
	ß I erase you from the face of the earth
½êk. ð Qå» @ I break your face 	PB@ ð úÎ« 	áÓ ÕºJ
jÖ
	ß We erase you all from the face of the earth
Table 3: Multiword expressions in our seed list.
Dataset # of tweets
REST API 2.8M
Timelines 107.5M
ALL 110.3M
Table 4: Breakdown of our ‘dangerous’ dataset.
Safe Dangerous Total
Safe 3, 570 52 3, 622
Dangerous 70 1319 1, 389
Total 3, 640 1, 371 5, 011
Table 5: Annotator Agreement of 5011-tweet sample.
9) @user ½K. Qå 	@ Ðñ¯ @ 	ámÌ ø
 X
é®K
Q¢Ë@ H. 
 	JÒÊ¾KAÓ
ÈA¯ èñ	 ©K. P@ ÈA¯
‘Don’t talk to me in this way, or else I hit you! Talking of
(marrying) four women!’
10) @user @user
	¬ñ Õæ

	¢ªË@ QªË@ H. Pð H. QmÌ'@ @YJ. K
	¬ñ
é	KðA 	g AK
 H. QªË@ QK
 	Q
	 	g AK
 	á
J
J
 	J 	m×AK
 Õ æ 	K @ Qk Õº¯Qm
	'
‘The war will begin. By God, we will burn you down, you
fags, you pigs, you traitors’
11) @user Ð 	PB @ 	XAë PYË@ 	áÓ @ñKY 	®J@AÓ PAÔg Õç'
 @X PAÒmÌ'@
HA 	KñJ
kBð Qå. @ñJ 	K @ ÈAêm.Ì'@ ø
 	P Õ» A
	®¯ úÎ« ÕºK. Qå	 	
‘A donkey will always be a donkey. You didn’t learn the
lesson. We have to hit you on the back of you heads like
kids. Are you humans or animals?’
12) @user ½ÊJ¯ @ . ñÓ ½gQå @ ú
k. @ð Õº
J
K. ú
»ðQ» ú

	æJ
¢«
‘Give me your address so I can come to you, and not only
kill you but also dissect you’
Measure Value
Avg. # timeline tweets 2, 313
Avg. # dangerous tweets / user 3.97
St. dev. 3.64
25th percentile 1
50th percentile 4
75th percentile 6
Minimum 1
Maximum 23
Table 6: Descriptive statistics of the timeline data of 1, 370
users who contributed tweets classified as ‘dangerous’ in
our annotated dataset.
Seed English Emoji
½m'.
	X @ I slaughter you
½ÊJ¯ @ I kill you
½J.J 	«@ I rape you
½K. Qå 	@ I hit you
½K.
	Y«@ I torture you
½K
X@ I hit/give you
¼YÊg. @ I lash you
½	Jª£@ I stab you
½gQk. @ I hurt you
½¯Qk@ I burn you
Table 7: Top 10 most frequent ‘dangerous’ seeds and emo-
jis in our REST API dataset.
4.2. Data Analysis
The fact that ‘dangerous’ tweets are not frequent in the
dataset suggests that this phenomenon of dangerous speech
is relatively rare in the Twitter domain. To further inves-
tigate the commonality of such a phenomenon, we extract
Models Datasets Precision Recall Acc F1
Baseline – 50.00 29.33 58.66 36.97
BERT Dangerous 58.42 60.10 74.27 58.98
BERT Dangerous + Offensive 53.80 53.44 66.11 53.52
BERT-Emotion Dangerous 60.06 59.24 77.97 59.60
BERT-Emotion Dangerous + Offensive 54.50 53.99 66.84 54.11
Table 8: Results from our models on TEST.
the timelines of the authors of tweets in the dangerous class
in the annotated dataset. Table 6 shows some descriptive
statistics of the occurrence of dangerous seeds in their time-
lines. We can see from Table 6 that timelines contain on av-
erage 2, 313 tweets for each user, and there are on average
3.97 tweets in each timeline containing a dangerous seed
token. This represents∼ 0.17% of the tweets for each user.
The average number of dangerous tweets is higher (n = 6)
for users in the 75th percentile as opposed to n = 1 in the
25th percentile.
To further understand dangerous language, we also analyze
all the 5, 011 tweets from our annotated dataset. We
identify a number of patterns in the data, cutting across
both the ‘dangerous’ and ‘safe’ classes. We explain each
of these patterns next.
Conditional threats: One common threatening pattern
involves conditional statements where the consequent in-
volves a physical threat by the speaker toward the ad-
dressee, and the antecedent is a conditional phrase involv-
ing deterrence of an action that can possibly be carried out
by the addressee or someone else. The following are two
examples:
13) @user úæ 	áK
ñ @ 	X @ ½m'.
	X @
‘I slaughter you if you (F) do anything’
14) @user

CÖÏ @ ÐAÓ@

@ AgQ.Ó

A 	Jª£ ½	Jª£@ 	¬ñ É®J 	K @ @ 	X @
‘If he transfers, I will stab you hardly in front of the crowds’
It is clear from Examples 13 and 14 that the threats are
directed to a twitter user mentioned in the tweet. So
these tweets are potentially part of ongoing conversations
between the person who posted the tweet and the user
mentioned in the body of the tweet. As Table 9 shows,
∼ 71.2% of tweets in our annotated dataset (across
the ‘dangerous’ and ‘safe’ classes) contain mentions of
other Twitter users. This percentage is higher within the
dangerous class (%= 78).
Threats accompanied with commands: Another com-
mon pattern involves a command accompanying the threat
as in Example 15 below. These kinds of threats are more
common in the dangerous than the safe class.
15) @user ½êk. ð ©® 	¯ @ B ù
 ªÊ
® 	K @ Èñ¯ @
‘I say get out before I hit your face’
Threats accompanied with questions: Another less com-
mon pattern is threats in the form of questions. This kind of
Phenomena Freq. Percentage
(non-
dangerous)
Percentage
(dangerous
class)
Mentions 3673 72.8% 78%
Questions 100 2.8% 5%
Emoji 2, 010 45.5% 36%
Conditional 742 15.8% 11.4%
Body parts 378 6.6% 11.3%
Hahaha 355 9.9% 1.1%
Table 9: The frequency of some textual phenomena in our
Annotated data.
threats occurs in about 5% of our dangerous data as com-
pared to 2.8% in the safe class. Unlike the examples above,
the reason behind most of the ‘question’ threats is not par-
ticularly clear as they tend to be short, sometimes of one
word. Interpretation of these threats requires more context,
beyond the level of the tweet itself. Examples 16-18 illus-
trate this category.
16) ?Q. mÌ'@ ÕË @ 	áÓ ½ÊJ¯ @ 	áºÜØ
‘can i kill you by the pen’
17) @user ? ½J.J 	«@ © 	® 	JK

‘Does it work if I rape you?’
18) @user ? ½m'.
	X @
‘I slaughter you?’
Threat accompanied by modality: Some threats carry de-
ontic modality where modals such as ‘would’, ‘probably’,
‘may’ are employed. Epistemic modality are also found in
some data points. Similar to the question types above, these
tweets (Examples 19-21 below) are less threatening than
Examples 13-18 above.
19) @user ½J.J 	«@ ú

	æÊªk.
‘May I rape you?!’ (deontic modality)
20) @user ½m'.
	X @ ø
 Xð
‘I would like to kill you’ (deontic modality)
21) @user ½JJ. m ©Ó ½ÊJ¯ @ hP ú
Î¾

‘I am probably going to kill you with your friends’ (epistemic
modality)
Metaphorical threats: Many of the tweets involve
metaphorical use of the phrases in our annotated data. The
target domain of the majority of these metaphorical uses is
either sports or relationships. Words such as ‘kill’, ‘rape’,
and ‘slaughter’ are used to indicate ‘wining’ in sport or
‘burn’ to mean ‘pain’ or ‘longing’ in romantic relation-
ships. Examples 23-24 illustrate these cases:
20) h@P èQºK. éK
ð@Q 	AÖÏ @ ú

	G @ñ 	kB Èñ¯ I. k@
@ñªJÒJ@AÖ 	ß @ð Qj. 	Ë@ð Q«
	YÊË ú
«@X C
	¯ ÕºJ.J 	ª 	K
‘I would like to tell my Manchester (football club) fans that
we will rape them tomorrow’
21) AÓ@Q 	« ½J 	®£@ð A® « ½¯Qk@ 
‘I will burn you with love and put off (the fire on you) with
affection’
Emojis: Another interesting phenomenon (see Table 9)
is the frequent use of emojis, which are found in about
40% of the annotated dataset. This is not surprising as it
helps participants mitigate (and hence better disambiguate
the nature of) their threats. Table 7 shows the top most
frequent emojis used in our REST API data. It is evident
that most of the used emojis do not indicate friendliness,
but rather have a threatening nature. This is also true of
using expressive interjections such as hahaha, which is
more common in the non-dangerous than the dangerous
class. Additionally, as mentioned above, some expressions
involve use of ‘body parts’ such as eyes, head, face, nose,
etc.. These are found to occur significantly higher in the
‘dangerous’ class.
Conversational context: Finally, Table 7 also shows the
top 10 most frequent seeds in our REST API dataset. All
of these seeds involve a first singular person subject and a
singular second person object, which indicate that many of
these tweets containing dangerous seeds are part of one-to-
one conversations on Twitter.
5. Deep Learning Models
Dangerous speech data. We use our 5, 011 annotated
tweet dataset for training deep learning models on dan-
gerous speech. The dataset comprises 3, 570 ‘safe’ tweets
and 1, 389 ‘dangerous’ tweets. We first remove all the
seeds in our lexicon since these were used in collecting the
data. We then keep only tweets with at least two words,
obtaining 4, 445 tweets with 3, 225 ‘safe’ labels and 1, 220
‘dangerous’ tweet (see Table 10). We split this dataset into
80% training, 10% development, and 10% test.
Offensive speech data. In one of our settings, we also
use the offensive dataset released via the Offensive Shared
Task 2020.6 This offensive content dataset consists of 8000
tweets (1, 590 ‘offensive’ and 6, 410 ‘non-offensive’). We
use the offensive class data to augment our train split.
Hence, we evaluate only on our test split where tweets are
restricted to our dangerous gold tweets in the annotated
dataset. We run this experiment as a way to test the utility
of exploiting offensive tweets for enhancing dangerous
language representation based on the assumption that dan-
gerous speech is a subset of offensive language. However,
6http://edinburghnlp.inf.ed.ac.uk/
workshops/OSACT4/
as we see in Table 8, this measure did not result in any
improvements on top of our dangerous models. In fact, it
leads to model deterioration.
Train Dev Test
#Safe 2, 727 244 254
#Dangerous 852 189 179
Total 3, 579 433 433
Table 10: Distribution of dangerous and safe classes in our
annotated dataset after normalization by removing seeds
and one-word tweets.
Models. For the purpose of training deep learning models
for detecting dangerous speech, we exploit the Bidirec-
tional Encoder Representations from Transformers (BERT)
(Devlin et al., 2018) model. For all our models, we use the
BERT-Base Multilingual Cased (Multi-Cased) model.7 It is
trained on Wikipedia for 104 languages (including Arabic)
with 12 layers, 12 attention heads, 768 hidden units each
and 110M parameters. Additionally, we further fine-tune
an off-the-shelf trained BERT Emotion (BERT-EMO) from
AraNet (Abdul-Mageed et al., 2019) on our dangerous
speech task. BERT-EMO is trained with Google’s BERT-
Base Multilingual Cased model on 8 emotion classes
exploiting Arabic Twitter data. We train all BERT models
for 20 epochs with a batch size of 32, maximum sequence
size of 50 tokens and learning rate up to 2e−5. We identify
best results on the development set, and report final results
on the blind test set. As our baseline, we use the majority
class in our training split. Note that since our dataset is
not balanced, the majority class baseline is competitive
(63.97% macro F1 score). Also, importantly, due to the
imbalance in class distribution, the macro F1 score (the
harmonic mean of precision and recall) is our metric of
choice as it is more balanced than accuracy.
Results & Discussion. As Table 8 shows, the results
demonstrate that all the models outperform the baseline
and succeed in detecting the dangerous speech with F1
scores between 53.42% and 59.60%. We also observe
that training on the offensive dataset did not improve the
results. On the contrary, augmenting training data with the
offensive task tweets cause deterioration to 53.52% F1 for
BERT and 54.11% F1 for BERT-Emotion.
The best model for detecting dangerous tweets is BERT-
Emotion when fine-tuned on our gold dangerous dataset.
It obtains an accuracy level of 77.97% and F1 score of
59.60%. We note that both accuracy and F1 are signifi-
cantly higher then the the baseline. As mentioned earlier,
since our dataset is highly imbalanced, F1, rather than ac-
curacy, should be used as the metric of choice for evalua-
tion. As such, our models are significantly better than our
baseline.
7https://github.com/google-research/bert/
blob/master/multilingual.md.
6. Conclusion
We have described our efforts to collect and manually label
a dangerous speech dataset from a range of Arabic varieties.
Our work shows that dangerous speech is rare online, thus
making it difficult to find data for training machine learning
classifiers. However, we were able to collect and annotate a
sizeable dataset. To accelerate research, we will make our
data available upon request. Another contribution we made
is developing a number of models exploiting our data. Our
best models are effective, and can be deployed for detect-
ing the rare, yet highly serious, phenomenon of dangerous
speech. For future work, we plan to further explore contexts
of use of dangerous language in social media. We also plan
to explore other deep learning methods on the task.
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